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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Compromise and Settlement-Insurance-Liability Carrier's
Settlement as a Bar to Insured's Suit
The standard automobile liability insurance policy provides that the
insurer shall defend any suit against the insured for personal injury or
property damage caused by accident and arising out of the ownership,
maintenance or use of the automobile. In addition the policy stipulates
that the insurer may make such investigation and settlement of any
claim or suit as it deems expedient. Two recent North Carolina deci-
sions have limited the effect of such settlements1 made by the insurance
company.
In Beauchamp v. Clark,2 an action for personal injuries, plaintiff,
while driving his father's truck, collided with defendant's vehicle. Plain-
tiff protested and denied fault when his father's insurance company in-
formed him that it intended to settle with defendant because its investi-
gation had indicated that plaintiff was at fault. Insurer, nowithstanding,
settled with defendant. Subsequently, in this action defendant pleaded
the settlement in bar. The court held that in the absence of evidence
that plaintiff ratified or assented to the settlement it could not bar his
action because the insurer had no authority under the settlement provi-
sions of the policy to compromise his cause of action. The court noted
that plaintiff was not the policy-holder, that he was not aware of the
policy or its provisions when he drove the truck, and that he had in no
way assented to the settlement.
This decision left some doubt as to the effect of the settlement where
the insured vehicle owner objected to, or was unaware of, the settlement.
In Lampley v. Bell3 plaintiff policy-holder first learned of his liability
carrier's settlement with defendant from the allegations of defendant's
answer. Plaintiff had told his adjuster, prior to the settlement, that he
intended to pursue his claim against the other driver. The trial court
held that the insurance policy constituted a binding contract between
plaintiff and his insurer which gave the insurer the right and power to
settle with defendant on behalf of the plaintiff and that plaintiff was
bound thereby. The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed, holding
that although plaintiff was a party to the insurance contract, the insurer
had no more authority to compromise his claims against the defendant
than the insurance carrier had to settle on behalf of the plaintiff in the
Beauchamp case.
1 "Settlement" as used in the text refers to a settlement made by an insurance
company under an automobile liability policy. "A completed compromise and
settlement fairly made between persons legally competent to contract and having
the authority to do so with respect to the subject matter of the compromise, and
supported by sufficient consideration, operates as a merger of, and bars all right
to recover on, the claim or right of action included therein; as would a judgment
duly entered between said persons." Beauchamp v. Clark, 250 N.C. 132, 139, 108
S.E2d 535, 539 (1959).2250 N.C. 132, 108 S.E.2d 535 (1959). -250 N.C. 713, 110 S.E.2d 316 (1959).
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Beauchamp and Lampley presented two distinctly different prob-
lems arising under the settlement provisions of an automobile liability
insurance policy. In Beauchamp plaintiff was insured under the terms
of the policy, but he was not a party to the contract of insurance. In
Lampley plaintiff was the insured policy-holder, a party to the contract.
Lampley points out that the holding in Beauchamp was not based upon
the absence of privity of contract between plaintiff and the insurer. The
reasoning behind both cases is that the settlement provisions in the
insurance policy do not grant the insurer the authority to execute a
settlement on behalf of the insured and bind him thereby, where the
insurer makes the settlement and procures releases either without the
knowledge or consent of the insured or over the protest of the insured,
unless he has ratified the settlement. It is not apparent which party has
the burden of proof. It could be argued that the cases indicate that the
defendant would have the burden of showing consent, knowledge, or
ratification ;4 but the plaintiff in Beauchamp undertook to prove that he
objected to the settlement and in Lampley that the settlement was made
without his knowledge.
An earlier decision shows what happens when plaintiff, having un-
dertaken to prove absence of knowledge or consent, fails to establish it.
In Cannon v. Parker5 plaintiff, the trustee in bankruptcy for the policy-
holder, was seeking property damages arising out of a collision between
the policy-holder's truck and defendant's automobile. Plaintiff alleged
in his reply that he first learned of his liability carrier's settlement from
the allegations of defendant's answer. On trial plaintiff, for reasons not
apparent, introduced his insurance policy and the release obtained there-
under, but failed to introduce evidence that he was unaware of the settle-
ment, whereupon defendant demurred ore tenus to the evidence. Held,
the settlement bound the plaintiff under the evidence before the court.
The court explicitly did not reach the question of the validity of the reply
because the plaintiff had failed to offer proof on the issue. The court
gave no indication that it considered the release as having been executed
under the terms of the policy. There was nothing in the record to show
that it was. Thus, the court, apparently relying on the fact that the
release showed on its face that the policyholder, and not the insurer,
had paid a certain sum of money to the defendant and had obtained his
release, held that the plaintiff's action was barred.
" The language of these cases and the cases which they cite'is subject to two
interpretations: (i) that the settlement provisions in the policy create a presump-
tion that the release is binding on the policy-holder and the burden is on the policy-
holder to show lack of consent or knowledge, or that he objected to it; or (ii) that
the policy provisions do not in themselves give the insurer the authority to settle
the policy-holder's claims and the defendait must show knowledge, consent or
ratification on the part of the insured.
5249 N.C. 279, 106 S.E.2d 229 (1958).
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In Beauchamp and Lampley the defendants were precluded from
using the settlements as a defense. Suppose that the defendants had
counterclaimed after the settlements were found not to bar the plaintiffs.
Could the plaintiffs use the settlements as a defense to the counterclaims?
The appellee's brief in Lampley presented this question,0 but since the
matter was not in issue it was not answered.7 An analysis of the con-
sideration involved in the settlement between the defendant and the
insurance company would tend to indicate that the plaintiff could use
the settlement as a defense. A release executed for a money payment
may take either of two forms. The only express release may be from
the payee to the payor; or there may be an express agreement that each
releases the other. The legal effect of either form is the same as between
parties to the release. The court will regard the release as it would a
judgment and prevent the releasee from later asserting his claim against
the releasor.8 In Beauchamp and Lampley the bargain took the first
form, that of a unilateral release. It is to be remembered that in those
cases the parties were not dealing with each other. One of them, the
plaintiff, was represented by his insurance company, which under the
circumstances had no authority to defeat any claim the plaintiff might
have had against the defendant. The defendant, on the other hand,
represented himself. Undoubtedly, he had the authority to give up any
claim he might have had against the plaintiff-indeed this was the very
thing for which the insurer was bargaining. Thus the defendant gave
up his claim against the plaintiff in consideration not for plaintiff's re-
leasing him plus a cash settlement in lieu of damages, but for the cash
settlement alone. Therefore, since the defendant had received all to
which he was legally entitled under the circumstances, it would seem that
he would be bound by his promise-namely, to forego suing the plaintiff.
Consequently, the plaintiff should be able to defeat the defendant's
counterclaim. The defendant could have avoided this result if he had
made sure that the plaintiff joined in the settlement agreement.
It is submitted that the court reached the correct result in the prin-
cipal cases. North Carolina is in line with the weight of authority,9
and, as pointed out in Lampley,'0 there now seems to be no contrary
authority. The opposite result in effect would have established the
insurer as an arbitration board with sweeping jurisdiction and authority.
G. DuDLEY HUIPHREY, JR.
' Brief for Appellee, pp. 7-9.
7 The author has been unable to find any case in which this problem was con-
sidered.8 Snyder v. Kenan Oil Co., 235 N.C. 119, 68 S.E.2d 805 (1952).
See, e.g., Fikes v. Johnson, 220 Ark. 448, 248 S.W2d 362 (1952) ; Hurley v.
McMillan, 268 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954); Birkholz v. Cheese Makers
Mut. Cas. Co., 274 Wis. 190, 79 N.W.2d 665 (1956); Annot., 32 A.L.R.2d 937
(1953).0 250 N.C. 713, 715, 110 S.-E.2d 316, 318 (1959).
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